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Abstract—A stakeholder decides which information to share
during requirements elicitation. These decisions are made under
uncertainty: stakeholders may not have precise, concrete, and
complete information about their own expectations from, or about
the environment of the system-to-be, they may misunderstand
information which a requirements engineer gives them, and they
may not have perfect knowledge about the various opportunities
that the current technology may offer. Stakeholders’ decision-
making is therefore likely to involve the use of heuristics.
Understanding if stakeholders do indeed use heuristics during
requirements elicitation, and if so, then which ones, should help
understand requirements elicitation better, and design methods
which can stimulate positive heuristics (those which help elicit
relevant requirements) and mitigate negative ones. This paper
defines what an elicitation heuristic may be, and proposes a set of
research questions under the form of a matrix for the theoretical
and empirical study of elicitation heuristics.
Keywords—Requirements, Elicitation, Judgmental Heuristics
I. INTRODUCTION
Requirements elicitation (or simply elicitation) designates
activities performed to collect information about the require-
ments of a system-to-be or the environment in which that
system will run. Elicitation produces information that is used
in other Requirements Engineering (RE) activities, the aim
of which is to produce a requirements specification, which,
in turn, will inform the engineering and development of
the system. Elicitation typically involves two parties: the
stakeholders and the requirements engineers. The latter elicit
information from the former. This elicitation process involves
decision-making; engineers decide what to ask or how to
otherwise stimulate the stakeholders to provide information,
stakeholders choose which information to provide to engineers.
Many factors influence stakeholders’ decisions to share or
not information. Elsewhere, we studied how the elicitation
context influences the information that a stakeholder chooses
to provide [1]. The focus in this paper is on the role that
uncertainty may have on stakeholders’ decision-making during
elicitation. Stakeholders may have various backgrounds, expe-
rience, expectations, and expertise. They may be concerned
or focus only on some aspects of a system, and ignore
others. They can thus hardly predict with certainty how the
system will influence their environment and activities. That is,
stakeholders make decisions under uncertainty, when choosing
the information to give during elicitation.
Decisions that people make under uncertainty are called
judgments [2], i.e., stakeholders make judgments during elic-
itation. Judgments are influenced by heuristics. This is the
case in general, regardless of what the decisions are about.
In their seminal paper on choices under uncertainty, Tversky
and Kahneman suggested that decision-makers use heuristics
to formulate beliefs to support judgments [2]. Heuristics can
be seen as strategies used by decision-makers to “reduce the
complex tasks of assessing probabilities [of an event] and
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” [2]. There
is considerable research on the identification of biases related
to judgmental heuristics. It suggests that using heuristics may
lead to non-optimal decisions [3]. Another line of work sees
heuristics as mechanisms whose deficiencies are compensated
by advantages. This is more recent research, which suggests
that a heuristic is not good or bad in itself, but is more or less
efficient depending on the context of the decision [4].
If heuristics influence judgments in general, then they
also influence stakeholders’ and engineers’ judgments during
elicitation. The premise of this paper is that if these impacts are
understood better, then that understanding can help engineers
during elicitation. For example, a heuristic might work as
follows: a stakeholder will not, or is less likely to argue against
a requirement which was given by an influential stakeholder.
Another heuristic may be that the stakeholder will not argue
against a requirement which was already approved by the
majority of the stakeholders. Elicitation can be adjusted to
minimise the influence of such heuristics, or to benefit from
these heuristics. For the first heuristic, if the engineer’s aim is
to get a requirements approved quickly, she may inform other
stakeholders about who gave it. If the aim is, instead, to find
out if some stakeholders oppose the requirement, then it may
be more appropriate to hide who gave that requirement. This
gives the following central research question: Do judgmental
heuristics influence elicitation, and if yes, then how?
The question above is hard. There is no known complete
set of judgmental heuristics in existing research on decision-
making in general. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no research on the role of the known ones specifically in
elicitation. There are no theoretical discussions which relate
judgmental heuristics to elicitation, and there are no tested
instruments for empirical research into the influence of judg-
mental heuristics on elicitation. The research question above
sets a long term goal, and this paper suggests a list of research
questions towards one aspect of that goal. Namely, this paper
proposes a research question matrix towards the following
research question:
Is there a relationship between properties of elicited
information and judgmental heuristics applied by
stakeholders when giving that information?
In other words, does the use of judgmental heuristics
during elicitation influence the properties of the information
obtained during elicitation? To clarify this research question,
consider the following example. In elicitation, it is common
to categorise some information that stakeholders gave as
being about requirements, while other information is about
the environment of the future system. One of the judgmental
heuristics discussed in this paper says that, if one needs to give
information, then among alternative information she can give,
she is more likely to give that which is easier than others to
recall from memory. In this specific case, the research question
becomes: Is information about requirements easier to recall
than information about domain knowledge? We identify many
such specific research questions, and suggest how to obtain
empirical data to answer them. The questions are based on two
sets of classification dimensions: (i) one set is based on prior
RE research, and gives rules for the classification of elicited
information, called statements below. These dimensions are
called RE classification dimensions, (ii) the other set of
classification dimensions are called Heuristics classification
dimensions. Each classification dimension is based on one or
several judgmental heuristics identified in existing research.
II. HEURISTICS CLASSIFICATION DIMENSIONS
We first identify existing judgmental heuristics and discuss
their potential role in elicitation. We take judgmental heuristics
which are likely to be used by managers and other corporate
decision makers [4]. We then discuss if, why and how these
judgmental heuristics might be used by stakeholders to decide
which statements to share during elicitation. The elicitation
heuristics suggest the Elicitation classification dimensions for
statements. The classification dimensions are not exhaustive,
as they are based on a subset of judgmental heuristics which
are currently known in research, and research on judgmental
heuristics is still ongoing, with potentially new heuristics to
be formalized in the future.
A. Recognition Dimension: Accessible or Distant
This first classification dimension is suggested by the
Recognition, Fluency and Take-the-first judgmental heuristics
[4]. These heuristics are used in recognition-based decision-
making. Namely, when a decision-maker has to select one
among a set of alternative statements, she will pick the one
she recalls the more easily and rapidly from memory. On the
contrary, alternative statements which are difficult to access
will tend to be overlooked, regardless of how relevant they may
be in elicitation. This suggests two categories of statements.
Accessible statements, which can be retrieved easily and/or
rapidly from memory or which refer to something that is
easily and/or rapidly retrievable from memory and Distant
statements, which are distant and difficult to retrieve from
memory, or which refer to something that is hardly accessible
in memory. An illustration of these heuristics is the case of
a stakeholder who has to select one refinement of a business
goal, among two different ones. The stakeholder may pick the
refinement of the goal that best fits with what comes the more
rapidly to her mind. Typically, this will be the alternative she
is more familiar with, that she encounters regularly, or that is
not too complex and hence relatively easy to remember.
B. Rationale Dimension: Verified or Refuted
This classification dimension is inspired by the Take-
the-best and One-clever-cue judgmental heuristics, and more
generally by heuristics used in the case of one-reason deci-
sion making [4]. These heuristics work on the idea that an
alternative statement is chosen as soon as it is observed that
this statement satisfies one specific condition. This condition
is used by the decision-maker either because it discriminates
sufficiently among different possible alternatives (take-the-
best heuristic) or because it is innate and the decision-maker
does not want to use another (one-clever-cue heuristic). This
suggests the following categories of statements. Verified state-
ments, which are selected by stakeholders based on a single
selection criterion, and Denied statements, which are rejected
by stakeholders based on a single selection criterion. For
illustration, take the case of a stakeholder who has to decide
which of two conflicting requirements to keep. The stakeholder
may decide to keep the requirement which requires less time
to develop, and consider no other aspects of the two conflicting
requirements such as the cost of development, the impact on
other systems in the business, etc. This criterion is used by the
stakeholder because, from the set of criteria she though of, time
of development was the one that was the most discriminant one
(take-the-best heuristic), or the one she always uses when she
has to make such decision (one-clever-cue heuristic).
C. Tradeoff Dimension: Consensus or Disagreement
This classification dimension comes from the Tallying
Heuristic, which implies to identify several criteria for com-
parison, and selecting the alternative which satisfies the best
this set of criteria [4]. The decision maker will evaluate, for
each possible alternative, the number of criteria that are met,
and will select as a solution to her problem the alternative
which scores best. This brings us to the definition of Elected
statements, which are selected by stakeholders based on more
than one selection criterion and Dismissed statementswhich
are rejected by stakeholders based on more than one selection
criterion. The illustration of this heuristic is similar to that
for the Rationale dimension; to decide between two conflict-
ing requirements, a stakeholder may consider three criteria
- namely, development time and cost, and impact on the
other systems - and select the alternative that matches most
of these criteria. The difference here is that each statement
is evaluated against each selection criterion, unlike in the
Rationale dimension where only one selection criteria is used
to evaluate the different alternatives. Although close in their
way of working, the output may therefore significantly vary.
D. Resilience Dimension: Default or Exception
This classification dimension is derived from the so-called
Default heuristic [4]. Roughly stated, this heuristic suggests
that a decision-maker will typically select from a set of
alternatives, the one that best reflects the standard way of
doing something according to her experience. This brings us
to the definition of the following statements; Default state-
ments, which a stakeholder selects because they reflect her
understanding of the world and Exception statements that a
stakeholder rejects because they clash with her understanding
of the world. An illustration of this heuristic is the case of
a stakeholder who has to decide if the business rule “backup
business data every hour” is still applicable to the system-to-be.
Perhaps the rule was initially adopted a decade ago, when there
was no reliable cloud solution. It is unclear if this business rule
is still relevant now. In order to decide about such problem,
the stakeholder may resort to the default heuristic and consider
that, by default of other indications that would contradict it,
the business rule is still applicable. Doing so, the stakeholder
decides to follow the standard procedure.
E. Imitation Dimension: Influencer, Majority, Minority
This last classification dimension is suggested by the
Imitate-the-Successful and Imitate-the-majority heuristics [5].
With these heuristics, a decision-maker selects a solution from
a set of alternatives if there are cues that others adopted
that same solution. Successful or famous people will be con-
sidered in the case of Imitate-the-Successful heuristic. Large
groups and majorities will be preferred when making use of
the Imitate-the-Majority heuristic. This suggests the follow-
ing statement categories. Influencer statements are statements
which a stakeholder selects because they seem to convey the
same information as statements given by individuals, who
are perceived as influencers of widely-held opinions. Majority
statements refers to statements which a stakeholder selects
because they seem to reflect the opinions of the majority.
Minority statements are statements which a stakeholder rejects
because they seem to clash with statements of influencers
and, or the majority. Say for instance that a stakeholder has
to decide whether she will ask to have mobile access (on a
smartphone or tablet) to the system-to-be. If the stakeholder
is unsure about this decision, she may decide to look at the
decision of other stakeholders. For example, she might follow
her superior’s choice, whichever it is. Alternatively, she might
make the same decision as the majority of the stakeholders,
even though she may not need mobile access. In both cases,
she resorts to the so-called imitation heuristics.
III. RE CLASSIFICATION DIMENSIONS
To identify RE classification dimensions, we review RE
literature which suggested taxonomies of goals/requirements.
We limit our review to dimensions which originate in some
way from speech acts of stakeholders [6]. We do not take into
account technical taxonomies which are specifically intended
for engineers. The list of classification dimensions is not
exhaustive, but provides ample material for the discussion.
For illustration, consider the following statements. Assume
that they are speech acts resulting from decisions made by
stakeholders in a context of uncertainty and are therefore likely
produced through judgmental heuristics. We want to discuss
how these statements differ from each others.
• S1: Optical fiber cables are used to transfer data anywhere
in the world in less than a second;
• S2: I wanted to access business data from my smartphone
in no more than 10 seconds;
• S3: I’ll use the app if it updates easily and no too slowly;
• S4: We used to know when our sales targets were achieved
when the indicator turned blue or green;
• S5: I think it is critical to me that, in case of server
breakdown, (i) a backup service is launched automatically
or (ii) the IT service is immediately contacted and a
warning email is sent to user.
A. Nature Dimension: Environment or System
This classification dimension is inspired by Zave and
Jackson’s distinction [7] between information related to the
environment of a system (domain knowledge), information
about what is expected from the system-to-be (requirements),
and information about how the requirements will be satisfied
by the system-to-be (specifications). This distinction leads us
to distinguish between two kinds of elicitation statements.
Environment statements focus on conditions and events in
the environment which may influence the system-to-be, while
System statements focus on conditions and events controlled
by the system, and, or which the system may influence in the
environment. In our running example, S1 is an environment
statement, because it describes a condition of the environment
in which the system will operate; the fact that optical fiber
cables are used is not related to the system, but to the
environment in which that system will operate. On the contrary,
S2, S3, S4 and S5 are system statements, because they all
somehow describe information about the system itself, and not
about its context.
B. Type Dimension: Function or Quality
This classification dimension comes from the distinction
made in RE literature between the so-called functional and
non-functional requirements, or goals. The former type of
requirements refer to a function, a service, that is expected
from the system-to-be. The latter type of requirements are
to be seen as constraints, or qualities, being set on how
functions are delivered [8], [9]. The fact that a requirement
is functional/nonfunctional has an important impact in terms
of validation; functional requirements have clear-cut valida-
tion criteria, while conditions to validate the satisfaction of
nonfunctional requirements are often hard to define. This val-
idation distinction leads to a RE dimension of statements with
two different level. Functional statements are about events and
conditions whose occurrence and holding can be established
without a doubt while Quality statements refer to events and
conditions whose occurrence and holding can be evaluated in
different ways, by different people. In our running example,
S1, S2, S4 and S5 are functional statements: they describe
things about the system or its environment which leave no
room for interpretation; for example, it can be established
without a doubt that there is optical fiber in the data center, or
that an indicator is green or blue. On the contrary, statement S3
is typically a quality statement, since the adjectives easily and
slow are likely to interpreted differently by different people.
C. Guidance Dimension: Problem or Solution
This classification dimension is due to the fact that stake-
holders may guide the analyst in different ways during elic-
itation. Most of the time, we expect stakeholder to simply
share things they expect from the system-to-be, and analysts
to find the best way to satisfy that requirement. In other
words, the stakeholder shares the requirements, while the
analysts identifies the specifications of the system so as to
satisfy these requirements [7]. Sometimes however, it may
also happen that stakeholders share requirements together with
some indications about how they expect them to be satisfied.
This distinction brings us to a guidance dimension, with two
types of statements. Problem statements are conditions and
events which are either undesirable, and need to be prevented,
or are desirable, whereby the statements do not say how to,
respectively, prevent or achieve these conditions and event.
Solution statements are about how to prevent undesirable
conditions and events and, or achieve desirable conditions
and events. In our running example, S2 and S3 are problem
statements because they describe behaviors with no indications
about how it should be satisfied. On the other hand, S4 and
S5 are solution statements, providing indications to engineers
about how the requirement could be satisfied. S1 is a Problem
statement about the environment: it describes a condition in
the environment (i.e. information can be transferred anywhere
in the world in less than a second) together with the way it is
achieved (i.e. using optical fiber).
D. Structure Dimension: Atomic, OR, AND or Complex
This classification dimension is common sense and is
inspired by the logical disjunction and conjunction mech-
anisms. More precisely, it starts from the observation that
statements being shared by stakeholders are not always simple.
Sometimes, requirements being shared may imply several
clauses to be related to each other with some conjunctions
and/or disjunctions. In RE, the structure of a requirements
or a goal is usually handled through AND/OR relations [10].
This brings us to an RE dimension with four different types
of statements. Atomic statements are about a single event
or condition, OR statements combine two or more mutually
exclusive events or conditions, AND statements combine two
or more events or conditions, none of which are mutually
exclusive and finally Complex statements where more than
two events or conditions are combined, some of which are
mutually exclusive. In our running example, S1 is an atomic
statement because it describes one single condition. S3 is an
AND statement because it involves two events which are not
mutually exclusive. S4 is an OR statement because it refers to
events which are mutually exclusive: the light bulb in a same
lift cannot be blue and green at the same time. Finally, S5 is
an example of complex statement, because it involves three
events combined with both AND and OR.
E. Source Dimension: “I”, “We” or Impersonal
This dimension is inspired by research on the impact of
groups on the definition of requirements [11]. The underlying
idea is that a requirement being suggested by a group is more
likely to be of better quality and creativity than a requirement
being suggested by some individuals alone [11]. This suggests
that a statement can be shared either as the request of a
single person, or as the result of some concertation between
several individuals. As it may happen that a statement cannot
be attributed to one person or group in particular (as the
result of culture, popular knowledge, science, etc.), we also
consider an impersonal source of statement. This leads us to
a three-level RE dimension. I statements are statements which
convey speaker’s own beliefs, and with which the speaker
does not convey that others hold these beliefs. We statements
are statements which convey speaker’s own beliefs, and with
which the speaker conveys that these beliefs are held by
others as well. Finally, Impersonal statements convey general
knowledge, opinions or ideas which cannot be attached to one
particular individual or group. In our running example, S2,
S3 and S5 are examples of I statements; they are expressed
as the result of an individual decision. S4 on the contrary is
clearly expressed as the result of a mutual decision. Finally,
S1 is about a condition that is not directly produced by the
person who shares the statement, neither by a group of several
stakeholders. It simply reflects a condition that is true and that
cannot be associated with one person or group in particular,
so that it is expressed in an impersonal way.
F. Time Dimension: Past, Present or Future
This dimension comes from the distinction that is some-
times made in RE between the requirements intended to
maintain a condition and the requirements intended to achieve
or cease to do something; for example, the patterns suggested
in KAOS [12]. We believe this distinction also applies to
statements, in a more generic form. We interpret “maintain”
requirements as being statements about the present situation;
something that is currently observed, and which may be
expected to hold true in the future. On the contrary, we
interpret “achieve” and “cease” requirements as statements
about the future; that is, things that are not true in the present,
but expected to be verified in the future. Although RE literature
does not define a type of requirement about the past, we
believe that some statements may be formulated about things
that were true in the past, and that do not longer hold. This
leads us to a three-level RE dimension. Past statements are
about events and conditions which occurred/held in the past,
and no longer do today. Present statements are about events
and conditions occurring/holding at present. Future statements
are about events and conditions expected to occur/hold in the
future, and do not at present. In our running example, S2 and
S4 are typical examples of statements formulated about the
past, for which there is not certainty today. S1 and S5, on the
other hand, are formulated to express current ideas or actions,
which are happening nowadays. S3 is a statement about the
future: it describes nothing about the present or past situation,
but simply states something about what is expected to hold
true in the future.
G. Mood Dimension: Descriptive or Prescriptive
This dimension is inspired by the distinction that is made
in modeling between models that describe the state of a system
or a domain, and the models that aim to describe what is
expected from future system or domain. Such distinction is
also common in RE; the i* modeling language for example can
be used in a descriptive way, as a mean to describe an existing
business, or in a prescriptive way, as a mean to describe
what context should be achieved via the new system [13].
This brings us to the mood RE dimension, with Descriptive
statements describing events and conditions independently of
being desirable or not and Prescriptive statements describing
desired events and conditions. In our running example, S3
and S5 are prescriptive statements because they clearly state
that there are some needs, and that actions are expected in
order to fulfill the needs. On the contrary, S1, S2 and S4
are descriptive statements; they describe things, with no clear
indications about whether these things are desired. The purpose
of these sentences is simply to provide information about the
situation, as-is.
H. Background Dimension: Experience or Speculation
This last dimension is based on the idea that, in a context
of uncertainty, stakeholders may be willing to express a
degree of certainty about the statements they mention. In some
cases, stakeholders may state that they “think” or “believe” a
statement, and that they are not “sure” or “convinced” of the
latter. One way to explain such difference between statements
is the background being used by the stakeholders to produce
the statements. Stakeholders may either justify their statements
with some of their past experience, in which case they will
appear to be relatively certain of the statements they share.
On the contrary, they may resort to speculation, and share
statements they are not certain of. We have found no research
in RE about that concept of statements background, yet we
believe it might be an interesting property to account for in
the rest of this paper. Experience statements are statements
supported by own experience, that is, events and conditions
experienced in the past. Speculative statements, or the other
hand, are not supported by own experience. In our running
example, S1, S3 and S5 are speculative statements. It means
that it seems, based on the statements, that the stakeholder who
shared the statement has never experienced it. This is clearly
not the case of S2 and S4, where the stakeholder clearly refers
to some past experience as a way to support the statement.
IV. A MATRIX OF POSSIBLE NEW ELICITATION FILTERS
We see research areas at each intersection of a RE dimen-
sion with a Heuristic dimension. In each of these research
areas, there are several research hypotheses, which always take
the same form; there is a correlation between one level of a
RE dimension, and one level of a Heuristic dimension.
A. Feeding the Research Question Matrix
These research hypotheses are the 220 empty cells in Fig-
ure 1, and suggest new empirical questions to be investigated.
It is not feasible to write down all the hypotheses suggested
by the Matrix, yet we believe it is useful to state at least
one of them explicitly. Consider research Area 10: “does
the imitation elicitation heuristic influence in some way the
chances of a statement to be a functional requirement (as
opposed to non-functional requirements, i.e. quality)?”. More
precisely, does the fact that a statement is a majority, minority
or influencer statement correlate with that same statement
being a quality or a requirement? Our intuition here is that
qualities have a larger granularity, so that the stakeholder will
only communicate it to the analyst if she is certain a majority
of stakeholders agrees on that quality, i.e., H6 (sixth box in
area 10): there is a significant correlation between majority
and quality statements. A requirement on the other hand has a
smaller granularity, which makes it easier for the stakeholder
to communicate to the analyst despite the statement being a
minority statement, i.e., H2 (second box in area 10): there
is a significant correlation between minority and requirement
statements. Our intuition about the other intersections (H1,
H3, H5 and H6) is that there should not be any significant
correlation, which are other relevant hypotheses to validate.
B. Empirical Evaluation of the Matrix
The matrix suggests empirical study of correlations and
relationships between the different dimensions. More precisely,
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Fig. 1: Research Matrix of Potential Elicitation Filters Studies
we suggest research which estimates the frequency in each
cell, or the correlation between two levels from different
dimensions. Ultimately, this would result in a map of the risks
and benefits of using some heuristics rather than others. For
example, looking in the first column, one could select the top
five values and the top five worst values. Doing so, we would
identify the statements that are the more likely to be shared or
overlooked by a stakeholder, using the Recognition heuristic.
Such a tool can be used during elicitation to help analysts elicit
more information. To obtain these values, specific empirical
tools must be designed, so as to capture statements and classify
them according to at least one heuristic dimension, and one or
more RE-dimensions. These statements, once collected, could
be summarized under the form of a contingency table like in
Table I, and reported in the matrix. The letter N refers to a
number of occurrence, and the ratio in Table I represent the
relative frequencies inside a research area. As a way to confirm
or reject the existence of an actual relationship between two
dimensions, statistical tests based on chi-square test can be
computed for each contingency table appearing in the matrix
(research area), such as Table I. Additional statistical tools like
the Pearson or Spearman correlation coefficient (depending on
TABLE I: A contingency table for the Imitation-Nature Area
Majority Influencer Minority
Environment NEMaj/N NEInf/N NEMin/N
System NSMaj/N NSInf/N NSMin/N
the type of data being collected) can be used to study the
importance and direction of the effects.
C. Positioning the Matrix
Most of the questions suggested by the Matrix remain
somehow unanswered in the context of information elicitation.
Yet, the importance of adopting a cognitive or decision-making
approach to elicitation and RE in general is often recognized.
In [14], RE is presented as a decision-making intensive activity
during which it is critical to better understand how engineers
and stakeholders reason and decide to treat information. A
similar view is adopted in [15], [16], where it is claimed
that RE engineers make use of various heuristics or stopping
rules to determine the sufficiency or priority of information
gathered during the elicitation of requirements. In [17], a set of
stakeholders enablers and inhibitors is defined, which paths the
way for future research on how heuristics influence elicitation.
In [18], it is clearly highlighted that cognitive sciences may
help RE community in better dealing with main issues related
to elicitation. None of the previous papers however conduct
actual empirical study, nor do they address specifically one
or more of the questions suggested by our Matrix. In [19],
it is claimed that most problems related to elicitation can be
traced to human cognitive limits, so that better understanding
those constraints and the strategies used by human to overcome
them turns out to be a worthy endeavor for RE researchers. We
found few papers dealing explicitly with the use of judgmental
heuristics by stakeholders, the biases such heuristics lead to
during elicitation of requirements, and the techniques which
could be used to deal with such biases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper suggests a set of research questions for the-
oretical and empirical research on the role of judgmental
heuristics in requirements elicitation. It starts from the observa-
tion that, during elicitation, stakeholders make decisions under
uncertainty. As a consequence, they may resort to judgmental
heuristics to make decisions about which information to share
with the analyst. Our focus in the paper is to explore the
usage of such heuristics and how it connects with the outcome
of elicitation. As a first step to answer that question, we
suggest a research question matrix, which defines a list of
research questions about the potential impact of heuristics
on the identification of elicitation statements. The matrix is
obtained from a combination of two different classifications
of statements that stakeholders can provide during elicitation.
The first classification, RE-oriented, identifies a list of dimen-
sions which can be used by analysts in order to characterize
and distinguish different statements. The second classification,
heuristic-oriented, identifies a list of dimensions which can be
used to explain why some specific statement was given by a
stakeholder. By combining these two classifications, we obtain
a list of 220 research questions, that we argue can be addressed
theoretically - through, for example, the study of ecological
rationality or judgmental biases in elicitation - or empirically -
through the study of correlation. The long term objective of the
matrix is to lead to new research on requirements elicitation.
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